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Abstract 
In today’s business environment, the trend towards more product variety and customization is unbroken. Due to this development, the need of 
agile and reconfigurable production systems emerged to cope with various products and product families. To design and optimize production
systems as well as to choose the optimal product matches, product analysis methods are needed. Indeed, most of the known methods aim to 
analyze a product or one product family on the physical level. Different product families, however, may differ largely in terms of the number and 
nature of components. This fact impedes an efficient comparison and choice of appropriate product family combinations for the production
system. A new methodology is proposed to analyze existing products in view of their functional and physical architecture. The aim is to cluster
these products in new assembly oriented product families for the optimization of existing assembly lines and the creation of future reconfigurable 
assembly systems. Based on Datum Flow Chain, the physical structure of the products is analyzed. Functional subassemblies are identified, and 
a functional analysis is performed. Moreover, a hybrid functional and physical architecture graph (HyFPAG) is the output which depicts the 
similarity between product families by providing design support to both, production system planners and product designers. An illustrative
example of a nail-clipper is used to explain the proposed methodology. An industrial case study on two product families of steering columns of 
thyssenkrupp Presta France is then carried out to give a first industrial evaluation of the proposed approach. 
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Due to the fast development in the domain of 
communication and an ongoing trend of digitization and
digitalization, manufacturing enterprises are facing important
challenges in today’s market environments: a continuing
tendency towards reduction of product development times and
shortened product lifecycles. In addition, there is an increasing
demand of customization, being at the same time in a global 
competition with competitors all over the world. This trend, 
which is inducing the development from macro to micro 
markets, results in diminished lot sizes due to augmenting
product varieties (high-volume to low-volume production) [1]. 
To cope with this augmenting variety as well as to be able to
identify possible optimization potentials in the existing
production system, it is important to have a precise knowledge
of the product range and characteristics manufactured and/or 
assembled in this system. In this context, the main challenge in
modelling and analysis is now not only to cope with single 
products, a limited product range or existing product families,
but also to be able to analyze and to compare products to define
new product families. It can be observed that classical existing
product families are regrouped in function of clients or features.
However, assembly oriented product families are hardly to find. 
On the product family level, products differ mainly in two
main characteristics: (i) the number of components and (ii) the
type of components (e.g. mechanical, electrical, electronical). 
Classical methodologies considering mainly single products 
or solitary, already existing product families analyze the
product structure on a physical level (components level) which 
causes difficulties regarding an efficient definition and
comparison of different product families. Addressing this 
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Abstract 
With the aging of the population, community-based elderly care service becomes popular in China. To improve the well-being of elderly people 
and provide high-quality service, smart products are used in home care and community-based elderly care service, such as remote monitor 
system, health monitor device and intelligent home appliances. Chinese government also carries out some fiscal policies to promote smart 
home care and reduce service waiting time. While various subsidy schemes are proven effective in healthcare and other fields, it remains 
ambiguous which scheme is more efficient in elderly care services. In this socio-economic context, we formulate stylized queuing models 
within a game-theoretic framework to compare two types of subsidy schemes: investment subsidy for service providers and price subsidy for 
elders using the service. The results show that investment subsidy is more c st-effective given the same waiting time threshold. Governme t 
should choose different subsidy sche es under different market condition, and use subsidy sch mes and waiting time threshold in combination. 
This study provides i sights for smart h me care service management and offers implicati ns for government in subsidy scheme selection. 
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1. Introduction 
With aging populations increases dramatically, aging 
problem has been exerting more and more pressure on many 
countries. At the same time, the appeal of the modern elderly 
gradually changes from life support focusing on extending life 
span to quality support that aims to improve life quality. 
Elderly care services, whether provided in institutions or the 
community are essential to the well-being of elderly and 
disabled people with limitations in performing daily activities 
[1]. At present, home care, community-based care and 
institutional care are the three main modes of elderly care 
around the world. Many studies find that community-based 
care service is more efficient than institutional care [2]. 
Compared to institutional care, most elderly people prefer 
home care and community-based services [3]. 
Thanks to advances in technology, many smart devices and 
applications are designed and applied for elderly people, 
especially for those who are in poor health status or disabled. 
To help the eld rs live quality life, numerous smart devices 
and technologies are applied in their homes, which is also 
known as smart homes. Among these homes, devices like 
remote monitor system, health monitor device and intelligent 
home appliances, not only make the elders’ daily life easier, 
but also make it convenient for service providers to support 
the elders. That is because the providers can better access 
elders’ routine life data with the help of intelligent devices 
and detect possible emergencies or urgent service 
requirements of an elder. Meanwhile, a community-based 
service provider is able to support everyday life of the elders. 
For instance, they can offer personal care and in favor of 
elders’ daily living activities as doing cleanings, cooking and 
health examination.  
In smart homes context, community-based service 
providers should provide pension products, such as smart 
devices, but more importantly, they need to respond to the 
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1. Introduction 
With aging populations increases dramatically, agi g
problem has be n exerting more and m re pressur  on man
countries. At th  same time, the appeal of the mod rn elderly
gr dually change  from life support focusing n extending life
span to quality support that aims to improve life quality.
Elderly care services, whe her provided in institutions or the
community ar essential to the w ll-being of elderly and
disabled people wit  limitations in performing daily activities
[1]. At present, home ca , community-based care and
institutional ca e are the three main modes of elderly care
around the world. Many studies find tha  community-based
care service is more efficient than institutional care [2].
Co pared to institutional care, most elderly people prefer 
home care and community-based services [3]. 
Th nks to dvances in technology, many smart devices and
applications are designed and applied for elderly people, 
especially f r those who are in poor health status or disabled.
To help the elders live quality life, numerous smart devices
a d technologies are applied i  their homes, which i  also
known as smart homes. Among these hom s, evices like
re ote monitor system, health monitor device and ntelligent
home appli nces, not o ly make the elders’ daily life easie ,
but a so make it convenient for service providers to support
the elders. That is because the providers can better acces
elders’ routine life data with the h lp of intelligent d vices
and detect possible emerge cies or urgent service
r quir ments of an elder. Meanwhile,  community-based
service provider is able t  support everyd y life of the elders.
For instance, they can offer personal c re and in favor of
elders’ d ily liv ng activities as doing cleanings, cooking and 
health examinati n.  
In smart homes cont xt, comm nity-based service
providers should provide pension products, such as smart
devices, but more importantly, they need to respond to the 
 Zhiwen Tao  et al. / Procedia CIRP 83 (2019) 716–721 717
2 Zhiwen Tao et al. / Procedia CIRP 00 (2019) 000–000 
elders service demand quickly and organize service resources 
for elders. However, among those public service systems with 
limited service capacity, people have to wait until being 
served. With the improvement of the modern economic level 
and the increase of elderly population, the demand for elderly 
care services has greatly increased. This also means elders 
served by community-based service providers may encounter 
longer waiting times after they propose a service requirement 
[4].  
Here, we define the waiting time in a community-based 
service context as follows. The waiting time that we focus on 
in this study is a periodical delay between an elder puts 
forward his service requirement and is served by community-
based service provider. Due to the capability of the provider, 
this kind of waiting time varies from the elders. As for the 
pension product and service providers, they can invest on 
their facilities by employing more professional clients, 
expanding service coverage and applying advanced 
technologies. These methods equips the provider to serve the 
elders more flexible and even reduce the waiting times. 
For governments, subsidization policy can shorten the 
waiting time and improve service experience in healthcare 
systems [5]. Many countries have taken measures to control 
public waiting time in healthcare systems. Sweden has 
introduced a waiting time guarantee scheme subsidy 
mechanism for elective surgeries [6]. The Australian 
government introduced a 30% health insurance rebate to the 
patients who purchase the private care service [7]. Meanwhile, 
some provincial government in Canada are considering to 
provide some unconditional subsidies to hospitals [8]. 
Chinese government also conducted out some fiscal policies 
to support the smart home care and community-based elderly 
care service [9]. But a key question for government is how to 
bring the best of a subsidy scheme efficiently in a service 
system. There are some studies which compare different 
subsidies to design the optimal subsidy strategy, but the 
results are varied in different field [10].   
In this paper, we want to compare two types of subsidy 
schemes. The first one is investment subsidy, government 
subsidy the service provider when they invest in reducing 
waiting time or improving the quality of their service. The 
second is the price subsidy. In this scheme, the government 
will give a subsidy for each unit of service when the service 
provider sell the service to a patient. Accordingly, the service 
provider will decide whether to follow the policy and adjust 
its service price and/or capacity. We try to answer the 
following questions: 1) what factors affect decisions of 
government and the service provider? 2) which subsidy policy 
should the government choose to reduce the waiting time?  
To answer these questions, this paper combines the 
stylized queuing models and Stackelberg game to analyze 
subsidy policy in healthcare systems. In the next section, we 
first explain the assumptions and analyze the benchmark. 
Section 3 and Section 4 study the investment subsidy and 
price subsidy respectively. Section 5 makes further 
comparison and discussion. In Section 6, we make a 
conclusion and describe the future possible research directions. 
2. Assumptions and benchmark 
Assumptions 1. The service system is modelled as parallel 
M/M/1 queues. 
Elders arrive according to a Poisson process at the rate  . 
Service rate   represents the service capacity of the service 
provider. The expected waiting time (queuing time) in an 
M/M/1 queue is 1/ ( )W    . We assume that 1    which 
ensures a stable queuing system.  
Assumptions 2. All elders have the same service utility v , and 
p  represents the service price. Elders’ waiting cost parameter 
is denoted as  , which is assumed to be uniformly distributed 
over [0,1] .  
This represents that elders are heterogeneous in waiting 
time sensitivity. The expected elder waiting cost is computed 
as W , an elder’s net utility (called the utility surplus) is 
( , )U v p W     . Since v p and p c , we can get v c . 
Elder will buy the service when the function 0U  , otherwise, 
he or she will leave the market. We assume that 
( , ) 0v p W     , then ( )v p W   , each elder belongs to 




     , recall that =1 ( )W   .Also, the arrival rate of 
the elder is ( , ) ( )p p    . Let 01/ a   and ( ) ( ) ( )p v p a v p     , 
then 2( ) 0p a a v p        and 2 2 32 ( ) 0p a a v p       . 
Table 1. Glossary of main notations. 
System parameters Definition 
  Waiting cost parameter of the elders, [0,1]   
v  Utility of the elder who gets the service 
c  The capacity cost per unit of service capacity 
0  Total arrival rate of the service request 
  Effective arrival rate of the service request 
  Government objective threshold of waiting time 
  Profit of the service provider 
W  Waiting time of the elders 
U  Net utility of the elder who gets the service 
TU  Total utility of elders 
Exp  Expenditure of government subsidy 
Decision variables Definition 
t  Investment subsidy parameter 
s  Price subsidy parameter 
p  Price of the elderly care service 
  Service capacity of the service provider 
As a benchmark, this section first considers the case that 
government does not give any subsidy to the service provider, 
or the service provider chooses not to cooperate with the 
government. This can happen when the government’s 
proposal is not practical or harmful to the profit of the 
provider. The provider decides the service price and service 
rate to maximize his profit. Elders decide whether to buy the 
service or not, which is reflected by the effective arrival rate. 
The profit of the provider can be modeled as follows:  
0ax ( , )M p p c                                                                    (1) 
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As ( , ) ( )p p    , we can know that 0  is increasing in  , 
so we first study the provider’s price decision given a fixed 
capacity determined by  . This assumption is applicable as 
the capacity of the public service system is not easy to adjust 
in a short run. The provider’s optimization problem (1) can be 
explicitly written as 
0 ( | ) ( )Max p p p c                                                               (2) 
Take the partial derivative of 0 with respect to p  yields 
2 2 2
0 ( 2 2 ) ( )p va vp pa v p a v p          and 
2 2 3
0 2 ( ) ( ) 0p a a v a v p         , so the optimal solution exists, 
and * 20p v a va a    . Substituting the optimal solution into 
equation (1), the profit function of the provider will be  
* *
0 ( | ( )) ( )p u v c                                                                    (3) 
The effective arrival rate will be ( )a a v    , as the 
effective arrival rate is no more than the total arrival rate 
0  , then we can get 0 01 (1 )v     , so 
*




1 1 1p v v
 
     
*
0 0 0( )( 1 (1 ))v c v        
0 01W v    
Proposition 1. If the service provider enters the market, then 
(a) 0 / 0W v   , *0 / 0p v   ; (b) 0 0/ 0W    , *0 0/ 0p    . 
As the service utility v  increase, the waiting time and price 
of the service increases. A higher total arrival rate means a 
larger market, and the provider prefers to offer service in low 
quality and price, which results in a relatively long waiting 
time. Consequently, when the utility is higher for the elders, 
more people are willing to purchase the service, and the 
waiting time will be longer. So, it is necessary for the 
government to take some measures to reduce the waiting time 
of those kinds of service. 
3. Investment subsidy cases 
This subsection considers the case that government gives 
investment subsidy if the service provider invests to reduce 
their waiting time below the threshold  . The timing of this 
game is as follows. In the first stage, the government declares 
the subsidy method and subsidy parameter. In the second 
stage, service providers determine whether to reduce the 
waiting time of their service system and decide the service 
price as well as their service capacity. In the third stage, the 
government will give the firm subsidy according to its 
capacity. To approximate equilibrium solution for the game 
problem, herein we adopt the backward induction approach. 
We first explore tentative optimal solutions for the service 
provider and then solve the problem of the government. 
The service provider’s aim is to optimize his profit  
1ax ( , )
        . .   W
M p p c t
s t
      
 
                                                          (4) 
3.1. Price decision with fixed capacity 
With the case of fixed service rate or service rate is not 
easy to change, the provider can only get a fixed subsidy and 
he will reduce the waiting time through adjusting the service 
price. The service provider’s optimization problem (3) can be 
explicitly written as 
1ax ( | )
        . .   W
M p p c t
s t
      
 
                                                           (5) 
By substituting ( , )p  into (5), we can get the optimal 
solution in Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2. For the case of investment subsidy with fixed 
capacity, there exist equilibrium solutions, where  
(a) if 01 /v    , then * *1 0p p ; 
(b) if 01 /v    , then *1p a v a    , *1 1    . 
With Proposition 2, we can see if 01 /v     , the 
provider tend to reduce the waiting time by adjusting the price. 
We know that 0 01W v     must be met as the objective 
waiting time is shorter than the case with no subsidy. In this 
solution, the constraint is stricter as 0 01 /v W   . When the 
service rate is low, the service provider will get a small 
amount of subsidy allowances. This suggests that if the 
objective waiting time is just a little lower than before, the 
provider is unwilling to reduce elders' waiting time due to a 
low service rate. 
3.2. The joint decision of price and capacity 
To obtain maximize profits, the service provider may also 
improve its capacity. Since the price decision is a function of
 , i.e., *( )p  , we can substitute *( )p   into 1 . We can get  
* *
1 ( | ( )) ( )( 1 )p u a v a c t                                                 (6) 
Proposition 3. For the case of investment subsidy with joint 
decision of price and capacity, there exist equilibrium 
solutions, where 
*
1 (2 ) 2a v c t a        
*
1 ( ) 2p v t c    
* 2 2
1 [ ( ) 2(2 )( )] 4v t c a v t c a          
With Proposition 3, we can easily know that the investment 
subsidy parameter influence both the price and capacity, but 
the threshold of the waiting time will not affect the service 
price directly. So, the government can both adjust the 
investment subsidy parameter and threshold of the waiting 
time to have better control. 
3.3. Government decision of investment subsidy 
The government is to achieve its objective waiting time 
with minimum expenditure. Similar government objectives 
can refer to [11]. Some study also proved that minimizing 
government cost and maximizing social welfare are 
equivalent [12][13]. The minimum government expenditure is 
easy to measure and interpret, so it more realistic and practical 
approach for the decision maker. Thus, government 
expenditure minimizing model could be expressed as 
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1  Min Exp t                                                                             (7) 
Substitute *1  into equation (7), we can get the optimal 
solution in Proposition 4. 
Proposition 4. For the case of investment subsidy, to make 
sure the firm will cooperate with the government, t has the 
minimum value, which is  
*
0 0 0 0
0 0
2 2 1 ( ) ( 1 (1 ))t c v v v c v   
 
          
Government’s expenditure is  
*




2 1( ) 1 ( ) ( 1 (1 ))
2 2    2( ) 2( ) 1 (1 )
Exp c v v v c v
v v c v c v




         

     
 
  
With Proposition 4, we can know when to decide the 
investment subsidy parameter, the government should 
consider not only the objective waiting time but also the 
market condition. TU  is the consumer total net utility, it can 
be obtained as 
0
( )TU v p W d

                                                                     (8) 
 By substituting the optimal solution into equation (8), we 
can get 
* 2
1 0 0 0 02
0
1 ( 1 ( ) ( 1 (1 ) 1)
2
   

      

TU v v c v  
4. Price subsidy cases 
For the price subsidy, the government will give a rebate for 
every unit service the provider sold. The timing of this game 
is: In the first stage, the government declares the subsidy 
method and subsidy parameter. In the second stage, firms 
determine whether to reduce their waiting time and decide the 
service price and capacity. In the third stage, the government 
will give the firm subsidy after he provides the services. The 
service provider’s aim is to maximize the profit 
2ax ( , ) ( )
        . .    W
M p p s c
s t
     
 
                                                         (9) 
4.1. Price decision with fixed capacity 
The service provider’s optimization problem (4) can be 
explicitly written as 
2ax ( | ) ( )
        . .    W
M p p s c
s t
     
 
                                                       (10) 
By substituting ( , )p   into (10), we can get the optimal 
solution in Proposition 5. 
Proposition 5. For the case of price subsidy with fixed 
capacity, there exist equilibrium solutions, where  
(a) if 0 01 /v s      , then * *2 0p p ; 
(b) if 0 01 /v s      , then *2p a v a    , *2 1    . 
With proposition 5 we can know that for the price subsidy 
with fixed capacity, the objective of waiting time can be 
higher than the investment subsidy which requires
01 /v    . As s  increasing, the value of the   also 
increases. This demonstrates that if the government want to 
reduce the waiting time slightly, implementing the price 
subsidy is more acceptable by the provider. 
4.2. Joint decision of price and capacity 
Substitute *( )p   into 2 . Then, we can get 
* *
2 2( | ( )) ( )( 1 )p a v s a c                                               (11) 
Proposition 6. For the case of investment subsidy with joint 
decision of price and capacity, there exist equilibrium 
solutions, where 
*
2 (2 ) 2a v c s a       
*
2 ( ) 2p v s c     
* 2 2
2 [( ) 2 (2 ) ] 4v s c a v s c a         
Compare Proposition 3 and Proposition 6, we can know the 
investment subsidy and the price subsidy have a similar 
structure in service price and service rate. Given that
*
1 ( 2 ) 2t t a v a      , we can know the profit of provider 
increases with t . For the price subsidy scheme, when s c , 
*
2 ( ) 2 0s s c a      . That means if the price subsidy 
parameter is lower than the capacity unit cost, the service 
provider will not cooperate with the government.  
4.3. Government decision of price subsidy 
The government is to minimize its expenditure to make the 
service provider improve their service quality and reduce 
waiting time.  
2  ( )Min Exp s s                                                                      (12) 
Substitute *2 ( ) 2v s c a      into equation (12), we can get 
the optimal solution in Proposition 7. 
Proposition 7. For the case of price subsidy, to make sure the 
firm will cooperate with the government, s  has the minimum 
value, that is 
*
0 0 0 0
0
2= ( ) ( 1 (1 ))s c v c v c v   

       
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2 1









5. Results and discussion 
In this section, we compare the investment subsidy and 
price subsidy to find which is beneficial for the government 
and the service provider. Besides, we also consider the 
interests of elders and compare the price as well as elders’ 
utility. 








































, then 1 / 0TU   ; (b) 2 / 0TU   . 
Proposition 8(a) indicates that with investment subsidy, as 
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the waiting time threshold increasing, the total utility of 
patient first decreases then increases. This is because when 
the threshold is low, the waiting time is very short and the 
service provider only targets a high-end market. Increasing 
the waiting time threshold will reduce the utility of this part of 
rich elders drop dramatically. But when the restrictions 
continue to be loose, more elders request the service, the total 
utility increases. But for price subsidy, the total utility strictly 
decreases. Hence, the government should adjust the threshold 
under different subsidy schemes. For the investment subsidy, 
the government should set a relatively higher or lower waiting 
time threshold according to the budget. But for the price 
subsidy, the government should set a low threshold as 
possible as they can afford. 
Proposition 9. Government’s expenditure under investment 
subsidy and price subsidy satisfies * *1 2Exp Exp . 
Proposition 3 implies that to achieve the same objective 
waiting time, investment subsidy is more cost-effective 
compared to price subsidy. That is because the investment 
subsidy is more concentrated on reducing waiting time, while 
price subsidy caters to elders. So, for the price subsidy, to 
accomplish the same target, the government needs to set a 
larger budgets. 
Proposition 10. When the service provider cooperates with 
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, then * *1 2  , * *1 2p p , * *1 2  ， 
* * *
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c v c v
v
，  from Proposition 10, 
we can see that if   is less than 0 , the investment subsidy 
scheme gets a higher total consumer utility. When   exceeds
0 , the price subsidy method achieves a higher total 
consumer utility. Therefore, we can see that the optimal 
subsidy schemes varies according to different markets. For a 
market with high-income and small elderly populations, the 
government should choose the investment subsidy. For a 
market with a low-income and large elderly population, the 
government should choose the price subsidy.  
6. Concluding remarks and future research 
Community-based elderly care service grows popular in 
China, which paves the way of smart products designed for 
home care and community-based elderly care services. For 
pension product and pension service providers, it is important 
to balance the service quality and operations cost. To reduce 
waiting times of elders using smart home care, government 
needs to make appropriate subsidy policy to incentive the 
service provider. This study formulates stylized queuing 
models within a game-theoretic framework to compare two 
types of subsidy schemes: investment subsidy for service 
providers and price subsidy for elders using the service. The 
results show that the government and the service provider’s 
decision can be influenced by market conditions like market 
scale and elders’ financial level. The government should 
choose different subsidy schemes under different market 
condition. That is to say, for the market with high-income and 
small elderly populations, implementing the investment 
subsidy and setting a low waiting time threshold is more 
beneficial. For the market with a low-income and large 
population, the government should choose the price subsidy, 
and combining the subsidy schemes and waiting time 
threshold is better. For future research, we may extend our 
study to a non-profit service provider and even consider the 
competition between different service providers. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
( | ) ( ) ( 1 ( ( )))L p p p c t p              





va vp pa v pL p
a v p a


   
   
 
 





      
So， we can get *1p a v a    , * 2 21 ( )a v a     , *1 1/    . 
If *1 0  , then 0 01 v W     .  
The profit of the service provider is  
*
1 ( )( 1 )a v a c t             
If a v a   , the provider’s time is already less than it, 
they do not need to reduce the waiting time to get the subsidy, 
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which is not in conformity with the reality.  
Proof of Proposition 3. 
*
1 2 2a v a c t          ， 
2 * 2
1 2 0a        







   
 
, *1 2










( ) 2(2 )( )
4
v t c a v t c
a
     

. 
Proof of Proposition 4. 
Substitute *1  into Equation (7), we can get 
1 (( ) 2 1 )Exp t v c t a      , and 01Exp t   , 2 21 0Exp t   . Hence, 
1Exp  is strictly increasing with t . 
To incentive the service provider to reduce the waiting time, 
the government should make sure that the service provider’s 
profit with investment subsidy is no less than the benchmark. 
So, * *1 0   should be met, then we can get  
0 0 0 0
0 0
2 2 1 ( ) ( 1 (1 ))t c v v v c v   
 
         . 
When * 0 0 0 0
0 0
2 2 1 (v c) ( 1 (1 ))t c v v v   
 
         , the 
government gets the optimal solution 
*
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Proof of Proposition 5. 
( | ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 ( ( )))L p p s p c p             
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So, we can get *2p a v a    , * 2 22 ( ) /a v s a      ,  
*
2 1    . 
*
2 0  , that is 
1 a v s
a
 
  .  
The profit of the service provider is 
*
2
1( )( )a v s a c        

  
Proof of Proposition 6 
*
2 2 2a v a c s           
2 * 2
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Proof of Proposition 7 
Substitute *2 ( ) 2v s c a      into Equation (12), we can get 
2 ( ) ( ) 2Exp s s v s c a     , and 02Exp s   , 2 22 0Exp s   . Hence, 
2Exp  is strictly increasing in s . 
The service provider’s profit is no less than the benchmark,
* *
2 0  , that is 0
0
12 (v c) (v c) 1 (1 ))s c v ca v

          , so
*
0 0 0 0
0
2= ( ) ( 1 (1 ))s c v c v c v   

      . The government gets 
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Proof of Proposition 9. 
* *
1 2 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0
[ 1 ( ) ( 1 (1 )
( ) ( 1 (1 ))]
2 ( 1 ( ) ( 1 (1 )) 1) 0
v cExp Exp v v c v
c v c v
v v c v
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The expenditure of investment subsidy is lower. 
 
